Iskander

The National Interest website has an interesting article on Russia’s Iskander missile.  The article describes the missile,
 

Russia’s Iskander system, particularly the Iskander-M variant, is equipped with two solid-propellant single-stage guided missiles, model 9M723K1, each capable of carrying a warhead weighing 1,543 pounds. These warheads can include high-explosive fragmentation, cluster, or even nuclear payloads. With an operational range of 249 to 311 miles, the Iskander-M can strike targets deep …
 
The missile’s hypersonic terminal speed, reaching Mach 6 or 7, and quasi-ballistic trajectory, which involves evasive maneuvers during flight, make it exceptionally difficult to intercept. …  Russia has introduced radar decoys that deploy during the missile’s final approach, generating false signatures to confuse air defense systems like the US-supplied Patriot missile battery. Additionally, the missile’s ability to perform unpredictable maneuvers at high altitudes complicates interception algorithms, reducing the effectiveness of even defenses. The Iskander’s mobile launch platform, which can independently target and fire within seconds, adds to its survivability, as it is challenging to locate and neutralize before launch.[1]

Impessive, on paper, without a doubt but this is not an invincible weapon.
 

This has been especially evident in attacks on Kyiv where, despite Ukraine’s success in intercepting some missiles, the upgraded Iskander-M has caused significant damage.[1]

It would be interesting to know the circumstances of the successful intercepts and the overall success rates.
 
It is also noteworthy that the reported successes of the Iskander tend to be mainly centered around attacks on cities rather than military targets.  It is possible that the Iskander may be more of a terror weapon, similar to Germany’s V-1 rockets in WWII, than an effective combat weapon.
 
It is also worth noting that Ukraine possesses only fragments of a comprehensive air defense system and in only limited numbers.  It may be that the Iskander successes are more the result of a lack of air defenses than the effectiveness of the missile, itself.  On the other hand, perhaps not.  What is the success rate of the Iskander when attacking targets defended by active air defenses such as Patriot?  We just don’t know.
 
 
Discussion
 
Several thoughts occur:
 
Where’s our version of something like this?  Which one of our missiles has capabilities of similar to this?  I’m not aware that we have a missile approaching this type of performance.  We have a lot of different types of missiles so maybe I’m missing something? 
 
How do we effectively defend against this type of missile?  Are we testing our defenses against a representative threat surrogate?  I know we’re not because there is no realistic threat surrogate.  Since we’re not testing, how do we know how our defenses will perform?
 
It’s clear that the Iskander is not unstoppable.  How stoppable it is in the face of an actual defense is unknown but there is no reason to throw up our hands in defeat, as so many do at the mere mention of hypersonic missiles.
 
This emphasizes the importance of deep surveillance to try to target the launchers prior to launch.  We have plenty of deep strike options.  What we lack is survivable, deep surveillance assets that would be unaffected by anti-communications efforts (jamming, etc.)
 
Intimately tied to deep surveillance is deep strike with an emphasis on rapid response.  We have plenty of deep strike options but they need to be linked with the deep surveillance and targeting so that when a target is found, a weapon can be on its way in moments to destroy the target before it can launch or move.
 
It is also important to apply deep interdiction to prevent resupply of enemy missiles from occurring.  There’s a limit to how much damage an initial salvo of enemy missiles can do.  The challenge is to prevent follow on missiles from reaching launch points.  This requires deep strike interdiction on the order of hundreds of miles inside enemy territory.  This is the kind of task that a carrier group or a Marine amphibious raid behind enemy lines might address.
 
The challenges are twofold: 
 
1. Develop our own version of such a missile, including a ship launched variant.
2. Develop realistic defenses that are be mobile and can move with our forces.
 
 
 
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[1]National Interest website, “Russia’s Iskander Missiles Are Giving Ukraine a Massive Headache”, Brandon Weichert, 24-Jun-2025,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-iskander-missiles-are-giving-ukraine-a-massive-headache

The Wrong Criteria

I continue to see the Navy’s fascination with unmanned craft despite them being completely divorced from any relevant Concept of Operations (CONOPS).  In the latest example, the Navy is diligently evaluating various unmanned vessels.
 

The commander [Rear Adm. Michael Mattis] of a US Navy task force [ed. Task Force 66] focused on employing unmanned systems said his team is making decisions about which can be “operationalized,” and which will be sidelined for further development.
 
The task force, which was established in May 2024, participated in Baltic Operations 2025 (BALTOPS), a reoccurring major international maritime exercise featuring the US and NATO countries. That exercise, which took place throughout June, played an integral role in helping the service evaluate various USVs on the commercial market.[1]

Well, that’s good, isn’t it?  The Navy is carefully evaluating various craft in order to make the best decisions, right?
 
Let me ask you this: what criteria are being used in the evaluation?  Different criteria will lead to different results.  What might be ideal for one task might be useless for another.
 
Of course, there’s only one criteria for any weapon system and that’s combat.  How will the item being evaluated contribute to high end combat?  If it can’t or won’t, then it has no value.
 
What is the Navy trying to accomplish with unmanned craft?
 

Mattis, whose office falls under the Navy’s three-star operational command, US 6th Fleet, described Task Force 66 as being focused on using low-cost systems, such as commercial-off-the-shelf USVs, to “impose costs on the adversary.”[1]

Ah … I see.  We’re going to “impose costs” on the enemy.  That’s great!  Just out of curiosity, I wonder what these mythical costs are that small, unmanned craft will impose?  It certainly won’t have anything to do with firepower since none of these craft have any firepower.  It won’t be near-invincibility causing the enemy to use vast amounts of their anti-ship missile inventory trying to kill them since none could survive anything more than a 0.50 cal bullet and the enemy would just use the unmanned craft as training aids for their ship’s crews to have target practice.  It won’t be sowing panic and confusion on the enemy’s command and control because I doubt the enemy will even care that much about them, assuming they don’t just laugh.
 
What are the “imposed costs”?
 
How are the unmanned craft being evaluated?
 

Mattis said the event included “red versus blue scrimmages” where sailors were tasked with participating in either side of an engagement featuring several unmanned surface vessels staging an attack on a warship.[1]

Wow, a free form, red versus blue scrimmage (I guess that’s what battles are called now?) !  That’s great for evaluating unmanned craft.  Although … the thought occurs to me, where/when would we expect a [Chinese] warship to present itself conveniently close to several small, unmanned craft, obligingly allowing the unmanned craft to approach, assemble for an attack, and then attack without hindrance?  How would these small unmanned craft get anywhere near a warship on alert?
 
We’re evaluating unmanned craft but we’re using the wrong criteria for the evaluation.  It’s as if we think the Chinese will behave like the oblivious Russian ships.
 
You know what the Navy should do?  They should skip any kind of focus on a combat CONOPS and instead leap right over that and get into the technology of controlling, networking, and interfacing small, unmanned craft.  Well, …
 

Tangential to operating individual USVs, Mattis said TF-66 is working on controlling numerous autonomous vessels through a “single pane of glass,” referring to the notion of commanding multiple vehicles through a singular command-and-control station. And beyond controlling multiple American vessels, Mattis said his team is also working to integrate that capability with NATO allies.[1]

You can see from this that we’re caught up in the technology and ignoring the CONOPS.
 
At this point, you might be wondering what type of unmanned craft we’re talking about?
 

Mattis said the Navy was using at least 10 Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft USVs during BALTOPS.[1]

Here’s a photo of the Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft.
 

Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft
This is what we're going to war with ?

I’m not sure where the “Global” comes from because the range of these tiny motorboats is probably once around the harbor.  “Reconnaissance”????  Whatever sensor they put on it will have a field of view of a few hundred yards.  Is that really reconnaissance?  How would something like this be of any possible use in a high end combat scenario?

 
Anyway … ignore everything I’ve just written.  Hail, unmanned!  Damn the logic, full technology speed ahead!
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Navy uses European exercise to help evaluate unmanned vessels”, Justin Katz, 23-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/navy-uses-european-exercise-to-help-evaluate-unmanned-vessels/

Chinese Ports in Latin America

Just a quick note documenting the expansion of Chinese influence.
 

Chinese companies are now involved in the construction or operation of 31 active ports in Latin America and the Caribbean — a significantly higher number than previously reported, according to new findings from the Center for Strategic and International Studies …
 
This includes ports built by companies such as CK Hutchison and state‑backed entities such as China Merchants Port.
 
U.S. analysts warn that key ports - especially Kingston, Jamaica, and Manzanillo and Veracruz, Mexico - present strategic vulnerabilities.[1]

Regarding Kingston, Jamaica,
 

The Chinese firm China Merchants Port Holdings is now in complete control of Kingston Freeport Terminal Limited (KFTL), the entity responsible for managing the Port of Kingston under a concession agreement made with Jamaica’s government. The agreement has a duration of 30 years.[2]

Regarding Mexico,
 

China is funding the expansion of the port of Veracruz Medico through China Harbour Engineering company. The expansion project will make Veracruz the second largest port in Mexico. In addition, the Port of Manzanillo is undergoing a $2.7 billion expansion project that will make it Latin America’s largest maritime gateway. Chinese companies like Hutchinson Whampoa have control over piers in several Mexican states, including Baja California, Colima, Michoacán, and Morelia.
 
In recent years, direct investment from Chinese companies into Mexico has experienced significant growth. This surge is evident in the figures, rising from $38m in 2011 to $386m in 2021. Notably, Chinese companies now represent the fastest-growing source of foreign investment in Mexico.[3]

Aside from the obvious concerns about China establishing control over ports and, eventually, shipping, Chinese influence on the political actions of cash and investment starved countries bodes ill for the US.  Again, China is not doing anything the US couldn’t have done.  We need to engage.  You can’t win a war if you don’t engage.
 
All of this demonstrates just one of the many ways that the Chinese are conducting their war of global domination:  control the ports and you control the global economy while simultaneously establishing strategic strongholds and gaining influence over the host countries.  We talk about all-domain warfare in our pathetic, limited understanding of the term while the Chinese are practicing true all-domain warfare, as we speak.
 
The US and the Western world need to recognize that a war is happening, now, and engage with urgency.  There is no reason that the US couldn’t have done what China did.  We were just too geopolitically lazy.  We’re losing the war.
 
 
 
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[1]Newsmax website, “Think Tank: China's Reach Goes to Latin American Ports”, Solange Reyner, 25-Jun-2025,
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/china-latin-america-caribbean/2025/06/24/id/1216332/
 
[2]Jamaicans.com website, “Chinese Company Takes Total Control Of Kingston Freeport Management Firm”, staff, 1-May-2020,
https://jamaicans.com/chinese-company-takes-total-control-of-kingston-freeport-management-firm/
 
[3]Jeff Newman Law website, “China funding port constructions in Mexico to shorten shipping routes to U.S. back door”, Jeff Newman, 23-Jan-2025
https://jeffnewmanlaw.com/china-funding-port-constructions-in-mexico-to-shorten-shipping-routes-to-the-u-s-back-door/

The Scale of War

ComNavOps has often stated that we’ve forgotten what war is and just how much of everything is required to wage it.  One glaring example is the shrinkage of our carrier air wings from a WWII high of 90+ combat aircraft to a Cold War level of 90+ total aircraft (including non-direct-combat helos, tankers, etc.) to the current level of around 35-40 direct-combat aircraft. 
 
The just concluded US strike by seven B-2 bombers on Iranian nuclear sites gives us a brief reminder of what’s required for a single strike.  The strike ultimately delivered 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOP) across two targets as well as dozens of missiles at other targets.[1]  However, many more assets were involved in the delivery than just the B-2s.
 

… involved more than 125 US aircraft, “dozens” of aerial refueling tankers, a guided missile submarine and firing approximately 75 precision guided weapons.[1]

All for a single strike against an essentially undefended target and with complete control of the sky.  The following gives us a reminder of the types of actions required to support a strike.
 

“As the Operation Midnight Hammer strike package entered Iranian airspace, the US employed several deception tactics, including decoys, as the fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft pushed out in front of the strike package at high altitude and high speed, sweeping in front of the package for enemy fighters and surface to air missile threats,” Caine [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] explained.[1]

Recall WWII carrier raids which, later in the war, involved hundreds of aircraft per strike.
 
We need to remember the scale of war and begin planning and training accordingly.
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense website, “Operation Midnight Hammer: How the US conducted surprise strikes on Iran”, Ashley Roque, 22-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/operation-midnight-hammer-how-the-us-conducted-surprise-strikes-on-iran/

Israeli Air Defense

As you know, Israel has established its multi-tier Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 2/3 defense systems for defending against incoming rockets and missiles.  Official claims have put the success rate somewhere in the 90+% range. However, based on careful consideration of photos and reading between the lines of various attack news stories (mostly Iron Dome) over the years, ComNavOps places the success rate at something closer to 40%-50%.  Now, with the latest hostilities between Iran and Israel, we are accumulating a new, extensive set of data with seemingly much less public relations spin applied.
 
A Breaking Defense article states,
 

As of this report, the IDF said Iran had managed to launch at least 400 missiles in 17 salvos since Israel’s strike on Iran last week, in addition to 1,000 drones.
 
The drones do not appear to have penetrated Israel’s defenses, but more than 20 of the ballistic missiles have, killing more than two dozen people.[1]

As of Monday morning, Israel reported 24 dead and 500 injured which gives an indication of the degree of penetration of Iranian missiles through the Israeli defenses.
 
So, what does all this tell us about the effectiveness of the Israeli defense system?  The numbers we have suggest a success rate of 95%, on the face of it, however, my understanding is that many missiles are not even engaged due to being assessed as not a threat.  Iranian missiles are not exactly renowned for accuracy.  Thus, if 400 missiles have been fired at Israel, only a fraction of them were actual threats and had to be engaged.  Here, now, is where we have no basis, whatsoever, to further judge effectiveness.  However, for the sake of illustration, if only, say, 30% of the Iranian missiles were actual threats then the defensive success rate would drop to something on the order of 80%.  You can plug in whatever numbers you wish and calculate resulting defensive success rates, if you’re so inclined.
 
The takeaway from this is that the state of the art Israeli defense system, matched against some pretty low capability Iranian missiles, still allowed, perhaps, something on the order of 20% of attacking missiles to get through.  What does this mean to us?  Well, consider what will happen when Aegis faces modern, highly capable Chinese missiles.  What will the defensive success rate of our ships be?  Who can say, but this is just another data point that leads ComNavOps to conclude that Aegis will be nowhere near as effective as we hope.  This, in turn, strongly suggests that we need to mount many more short range and close in weapons on our ships.  Combine this with the analyses we’ve done about engagement windows and it paints a pretty bleak picture – one that Navy leadership is ignoring instead of preparing for.
 
 
 
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[1] Breaking Defense website, “Left of boom: Israeli strikes concentrate on Iranian missile threat”, Seth J. Frantzman, 18-Jun-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/left-of-boom-israeli-strikes-concentrate-on-iranian-missile-threat/

DOT&E Reductions and a New Director

As you know, ComNavOps is not yet an enthusiastic supporter of SecDef Hegseth.  He says the right things but his actions, thus far, have been lacking and only sporadically beneficial.  He hasn’t done anything horribly wrong but he’s also not implemented the kind of wholesale changes needed.  Changes around the periphery are not going to improve the Department of Defense.
 
We now get notice of what is possibly his first blatant mistake:  cutting the Director, Operation Test & Evaluation (DOT&E).  If you’ve followed the blog for any length of time, you know that ComNavOps has been a big fan of DOT&E’s work, believing that they are the only force keeping the Navy (and military, in general) from committing wholesale, blatant fraud when it comes to weapon system testing.  Indeed, the Navy (and military, in general) has been highly critical of DOT&E which tells me that DOT&E is on the right path.
 
Now, SecDef Hegseth is proposing cuts to DOT&E.
 

In a bid to save what he estimated as $300 million per year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has laid out a plan to reshape the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation by eliminating positions and layoff contractors supporting the team.[1]

Is saving $300M per year – and almost free sum of money by Pentagon standards – really worth possibly impeding the only Pentagon related organization that seems to function well?
 
A memo from Hegseth stated,
 

“A comprehensive internal review has identified redundant, non-essential, non-statutory functions within ODOT&E that do not support operational agility or resource efficiency, affecting our ability to rapidly and effectively deploy the best systems to the warfighter.”[1]

This sounds suspiciously like buzzword bingo, the affliction of the Pentagon.  I hope this is not happening to SecDef Hegseth.
 
In a fairly major change included with the manning cuts announcement, SecDef is also assigning a new acting Director.
 

Hegseth said he has appointed Carroll Quade to perform the duties of the Director of DOT&E. Quade is currently serving as the Navy’s deputy for Test and Evaluation for the Navy.[1]

I have no problem with this as the last few Directors were significant steps back from Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, who set the standard for DOT&E.  Recent Directors have virtually eliminated public oversight and information under the excuse of secrecy.  While truly classified information should not be made public, if you expect public support – in the form of taxes – you must provide some degree of feedback and information to the public.
 
To be fair, I have no knowledge about the inner workings of DOT&E.  Perhaps the group had become bureaucratically bloated and needs trimming.  However, note that the group only has 94 people (82 civilians, 12 military members).  SecDef proposes reducing that staffing to 30 civilians, 15 military personnel, and one senior leader.  Given that the group is responsible for testing every US military weapon, sensor, and system, this seems like a foolhardy reduction.
 
I fear that SecDef Hegseth is in over his head and is making changes almost randomly.  Time will tell.
 
 
 
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Hegseth reshaping Pentagon’s weapons testing oversight office, cutting staff positions”, Ashley Roque, 28-May-2025,
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/hegseth-reshaping-pentagons-weapons-testing-oversight-office-cutting-staff-positions/

China Defeats US in Trade Deal

News has just come out that Trump has reached a trade deal with China and, at first glance, it appears to be a strategic defeat for the US.
 
Note:  We’re not going to discuss the political or financial aspects of the deal, only the military implications.
 
With regard to the military, the two key elements of the deal are:
 
1. US will continue to receive magnets and rare earths
2. US will continue to accept Chinese students
 
The magnets and rare earths aspect only furthers our vulnerability to this strategically vital resource.  China has never met a treaty or deal that it wasn’t willing to break (UNCLOS tribunal, for example) when it suited them so why would we think that China won’t threaten to cut off our supply the next time some disagreement or crisis arises?  We are continuing our dependency on our enemy.  That’s insane.  It would be far better to quit, cold turkey, and initiate a crash program to produce our own materials.
 
If this deal were just a stopgap while we frantically established our own strategic materials supply, I might be able to accept it but I see no evidence that we’re engaged in any massively accelerated program to do so.  Human nature, being what it is, we’ll just continue to depend on China without really addressing our vulnerability in any useful time frame.
 
We should be waiving every permit and review requirement in order to establish our supply as quickly as possible.  If necessary, we should be subsidizing construction and production;  after all, it’s a strategic necessity!
 
Every Chinese student we educate is both a technological spy and a future scientific asset to be used against us.  We are educating our enemy and giving them a look at cutting edge university research.  That’s insane.
 
From a military perspective, I can’t understand what Trump was thinking.  If I’m China, I’m extremely happy with the deal.